Tuesday, January 21, 2014

Here is a copy of the Verified Complaint of API investor Charles Knowles, in his lawsuit against Advanced Photonix for shareholders rights under proxy vote 6


My Note: A hearing is set on this matter tomorrow in the Delaware Chancery Court on Mr. Knowles Motion for Summary Judgment, and API's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Amazing that the API Board of Directors opposes the vote, and wishes of a vast majority of their shareholders. Some people never learn! I would ask the THz community help support the API shareholders (including myself) in their fight, for what in my opinion, is fair, just and right! (Note that I received this document in a PDF format, and the formating here is a little off, and there may be some typo's generated in the transfer, for which I apologize.)

EFiled:  Nov 06 2013 09:39AM EST  
Transaction ID 5450545 Case No. 9064­ 
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE






CHARLES M. KNOWLES, JR. ,


Plaintiff,


v.

ADVANCED PHOTONIX, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,

Defendant.







C.A. No._ _ __ _ _ _ _





                              VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF 


Charles M. Knowles, Jr. ("Knowles"), by undersigned counsel, hereby brings this action against Advanced Photonix, Inc. ("API" or the "Company"). Knowles alleges, upon knowledge as to himself and his own acts and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:

                           SUMMARY OF ACTION

1.          Knowles seeks summary declarations pursuant to Section 111 of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") that, pursuant to the API bylaws (a true and correct copy of which, as obtained from www.sec.gov, is attached hereto as Exhibit A), at all meetings of the stockholders, all questions - including stockholder proposals to amend the Company's bylaws -shall be determined by a majority vote of the shares entitled to vote on such matters present in person or by proxy, except as to the election of directors or as to matters for which the manner of deciding is otherwise specifically regulated by statute.             Approval of proposals (other than election of directors or as to matters otherwise regulated by statute) require a number of votes for" that is equal to or greater than half the quorum plus one, illustrated as follows:

V 1V otes "for" ::::: COli sham represented in person orby proxy to cast a VOle) + 1
 
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2.          Knowles further seeks a declaration that broker non-votes, which may be counted

for purposes of quorum, must be disregarded for purposes of proposals to amend the bylaws of

API, and thus have no effect on the vote results.

3.          Finally, Knowles seeks a declaration, pursuant to DGCL § 225(b), that as a result

of the vote of stockholders at the Company's last annual meeting, held on August 23, 2013, the

stockholders adopted the stockholder proposal to amend the Company's bylaws to allow

stockholders to nominate director candidates for inclusion in the Company's proxy materials.

THE PARTIES

4.           Plaintiff Charles M. Knowles, Jr., 124 Golfmeadows Lane, Chapmanville, WV

25508, owns 522,563 shares of the Class A Common Stock of Advanced Photonix, Inc.

5.          Defendant Advanced Photonix, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal

place of business at 2925 Boardwalk, Ann Arbor, Michigan. API describes itself as a company

engaged in the development and manufacture of optoelectronic devices and value-added sub-

systems and systems. API Class A Common Stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange

under the symbol "API".

JUTRISDICTION

6.           This Court has jurisdiction over this matter as it arises under 8 Del. C. §§ III and


225(b).

BACKGROlJND

I.           API STOCKHOLDERS HAVE NOT HAD THE CHOICE TO VOTE FOR
ANYONE OTHER THAN INCUMBENT BOARD MEMBERS FOR THE PAST
EIGHT YEARS.

7.          Each year, during the Annual Meeting of Stockholders, API stockholders elect the

six members of the API Board of Directors, who serve for a one-year tenn. The nominees





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available for a vote to serve on the Board of Directors must be recommended by the API

Nominating and Governance Committee and approved by the API Board.

8.          At the recent API Annual Meeting of Stockholders, all nominees for a vote to

serve on the board were incumbent directors.              In fact, the Nominating and Governance

Committee has not "nominated" a new director since 2005, approximately eight years ago -

despite substantial efforts by certain API stockholders to provide options.

9.          By letter dated January 11, 2011, from General (ret) Robert H. "Doc" Foglesong

("Dr. Foglesong") to Richard D. Kurtz, API Chairman of the Board and CEO, (a true and correct

copy of which is set forth as Exhibit B), Dr. Foglesong asked to be considered for a position as a

member of the Board of the Company.

10.         On or about April 18, 2011, Knowles submitted his request that Dr. Foglesong be

considered as a nominee available for a vote to serve on the API Board (a true and correct copy

of which is set forth as Exhibit C).              Knowles knows Dr. Foglesong to be a fellow API

stockh~lder who, among other things, is a retired General of the United States Air Force, holds a

PhD in chemical engineering, is a former president of Mississippi State University, sits on the

board of directors of several corporations and is a member of the Council of Foreign Relations.

11.         Despite recommending such a worthy nominee, API provided no response or

acknowledgment regarding the two nominations of Dr. Foglesong.

12.         On or about March 9, 2012, Knowles again submitted a request that Dr.

Foglesong be considered as a nominee to serve on the API Board (a true and correct copy of

which is set forth as Exhibit D).

13.         By letter dated April 16, 2012, (a true and correct copy of which is set forth as

Exhibit E), Lance A. Brewer ("Brewer"), the Chairman of the Nominating and Governance





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Committee, acknowledged that "Dr. Foglesong's appointment was considered (and rejected) by

the Nominating Committee and the Board last year, and will be reconsidered in connection with

the preparations for the Conlpany's Annual Meeting of Stockholders to be held later this year."

Note that Knowles did not request the "appointment" of Dr. Foglesong; rather, Knowles

requested that Dr. Foglesong be included as a nominee.

14.         By letter dated May 23, 2012 (a true and correct copy of which is set forth as

Exhibit F), Brewer again noted, "The appointment of Dr. Dr. [sic] Foglesong was considered

(and rejected) by the Nominating Committee and the Board last year, and will be reconsidered in

connection with API's upcoming Annual Meeting of Stockholders to be held later this year."

15.         Both the April 16, 2012 and the May 23, 2012 letters from Brewer noted that Dr.

Foglesong would be reconsidered in connection with the preparations for the Company's Annual

Meeting of Stockholders in 2012.

16.         During a telephone conversation between Knowles and Brewer in June 2012 to

assess why Dr. Foglesong was considered and rejected in 2011, Brewer stated that "He did not

remember Dr. Foglesong being considered in 2011."

17.         By letter dated July 11, 2012 (a true and correct copy of which is set forth as

Exhibit G), API advised Knowles that no compelling case had been made to change the

composition of the Board, and thus, his proposed nomination was rejected.

18.         On or about July 27, 2012, Knowles sent an email message to Richard D. Kurtz

requesting a copy of the minutes of the 2011 meeting of the Nominating and Governance

Committee during which the request to include Dr. Foglesong as a nominee was considered (a

true and correct copy of which is set forth as Exhibit H).







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19.         By letters dated August 10, 2012 (a true and correct copy of which is set forth as

Exhibit I), API and its counsel wrote to Knowles. API's counsel addressed Knowles' "various

actions...to advance the candidacy of Dr. Fogelson [sic] as a member of the Company's

Board..."     API's counsel also advised Knowles to seek legal counsel, noting a panoply of

potential violations of the federal securities laws and applicable Delaware law by Knowles.

Finally, API's counsel, on behalf of the Company, informed Knowles that his request to access

the minutes of the meeting of Nominating and Governance Committee during which the request

to include Dr. Foglesong as a nominee was considered (noted above) was denied, and instead,

referred Knowles to the process under DGCL § 220 to access the books and records he sought.

20.         As a result, the existing members of the API Board of Directors remained immune

from challenge.

II.         KNOWLES SEEKS IMPROVED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.

21.         Knowles sought to improve corporate governance by seeking a vote to anlend the

API bylaws at the Company's Annual Meeting scheduled for August 2013. The amendment

would give stockholders that own at least one percent of API stock for at least one year the

ability to nominate directors to the API board of directors and to have those nominees included

in the Company's proxy materials. In addition, Knowles proposed an amendment to the bylaws

designed to hannonize API's bylaws with DGCL § 112.

22.         Candidates for election to the API board of directors are selected by the

Nominating and Governance Committee of the Board of Directors.                The Nominating and

Governance Committee may consider candidates recommended by stockholders, but such

candidates will not become nominees for election to the Board unless approved by the

Nominating Committee.





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23.        Despite recommendations submitted to the Nominating and Governance


Committee by stockholders, no one other than incumbents serves on the API Board of Directors


of the Company. That has been the case since 2004, as 2005 was the last time a non-incumbent


nominee was available for stockholder vote. As noted above, Knowles himself has nominated


candidates for inclusion as a nominee without success.


24.        To improve corporate governance and access by stockholders, Knowles timely


submitted a stockholder proposal, "Proposal 6," which stated:

That Section 6 of the Corporation's bylaws be amended to include the following
subsection (4):

If this Corporation solicits proxies with respect to an election of directors, it shall include in its proxy solicitation materials (including any form of proxy it distributes), at the
Corporation's expense, one or more individuals nominated by a nominating stockholder,
in addition to individuals nominated by the board of directors. For the purpose of this subsection (4), a "nominating stockholder" shall mean one or more persons who have
held, directly or in street name, at least one percent (1 %) of the Corporation's issued and outstanding common stock for at least one year prior to the date of the stockholder's nomination. The provisions of this subsection (4) may only be amended by a vote of the stockholders.

III.         BOARD OPPOSES KNOWLES.

25.        In the Company's Proxy Materials filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange


Commission ("SEC"), API expressed its strong opposition to Proposal 6. The Board of Directors,


who together with the executive officers own approximately 3,984,569 shares of API,


unanimously recommended a vote against Proposal 6, although they noted that the stockholder


proposal did not violate either Delaware law or any SEC or NYSE rules or regulations applicable


to the Company.


26.        On August 21, 2013, API filed Definitive Additional Materials to "clarify" and


"correct" statements made by Knowles in a July 11, 2013 letter. (A true and correct copy of the






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Definitive Additional Materials, as obtained from www.sec.gov, is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.)

The Board's August 21 letter demonstrates management's vehement opposition to Proposal 6.


IV.        VOTE REQUIRED UNDER THE API BYLAWS.

27.         Article 1, Sec. 4, of the API bylaws, relating to voting, states that:

Sec. 4. VOTING. At all meetings of the stockholders, all questions, the manner of deciding which is not specifically regulated by statute, shall be determined by a majority vote of the shares entitled to vote on such matters present in person or by proxy, other than the election of directors, which shall be determined by a plurality of votes of the
shares entitled to vote on the election of directors present in person or by proxy. (emphasis added).

28.        Thus, Proposal 6 of the API Annual Meeting required a majority vote of those

present at the meeting.


29.        Despite the above-cited provision of the API bylaws, the Company stated in the

Preliminary Proxy Statement that, "Proposal must receive the "FOR" vote of a majority of the

shares of Common Stock outstanding (which constitutes the whole capital stock of the Company)


entitled to vote at the 2013 Annual Meeting. Abstentions and broker non-votes will have the

same effect as a vote against the proposal."

30.         By letter dated July 5, 2013, (a true and correct copy of which is set forth as


Exhibit K), Knowles, through counsel, advised the Company that its preliminary proxy statenlent

on file with the SEC inaccurately stated the required vote to approve Proposal 6.


31.         By letter dated July 9, 2013, (a true and correct copy of which is set forth as

Exhibit L), API, through counsel, advised that, "the Company disagrees with your reading of the

Company's By-laws and does not believe that there is any conflict between the By-law

provisions you cite." Moreover, API noted that "the voting standard for the adoption of your


client's proxy access proposal is correctly stated in the Compcmy's preliminary proxy materi81s

as the affirmative vote of a majority of the Company's outstanding shares."




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v.         THE ANNUAL MEETING.

32.         On August 23,2013, the Company held its 2013 Annual Meeting of Stockholders

(the "2013 Annual Meeting"), where the Company's stockholders voted on six proposals,

including Proposal 6, the proposal to amend the Company's bylaws to allow stockholders to

nominate director candidates for inclusion in the Company's proxy materials, if properly

presented at the 2013 Annual Meeting. (A true and correct copy of the 2013 Proxy Statement, as

obtained from www.sec.gov, is attached hereto as Exhibit M.)

33.         According to the Company's Current Report filed on Form 8-k on August 26,

2013 ("August 26 Form 8-K," a true and correct copy of which, as obtained from www.sec.gov,

is attached hereto as Exhibit N), there were 11,970,378 votes in favor and 3,538,820 votes

against Proposal 6. As noted in the Company's Proxy Materials filed with the SEC, the Board of

Directors and the executive officers - who strongly opposed Proposal 6 - own 3,984,569 shares

of stock (slightly more than the votes against). While the Board was not in favor on Proposal 6,

three times the number of shares were in favor; that is, nearly 12 million shares cast their vote in

favor of the Proposal. If Board of Directors and the executive officers voted their shares in

accordance with their stated opposition, then one could assume that non-insider stockholders

approved Proposal 6 by a margin of 12 million shares to zero.

34.         Applying Article 1, Sec. 4, of the API bylaws Proposal 6 was approved by the

stockholders of API. The vote occurred during the API 2013 Annual Meeting ("At all meetings

of the stockholders... "), the vote at issue relates to Proposal 6, the manner of which is not

specifically regulated by statute (" ...all questions, the manner of deciding which is not

specifically regulated by statute... "), for which stockholders present voted in favor by a margin

of over 3-to-l (" ... shall be determined by a majority vote of the shares entitled to vote on such





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matters present in person or by proxy"), and which is not for the election of directors ("...other

than the election of directors ... ").

VI.        BOARD TAKES THE POSITION THAT PROPOSAL 6 REQUIRES MORE
THAN MAJORITY.

35.        As announced in the August 26 Form 8-K, management concluded that the


stockholders rejected Proposal 6, which requested that the Board amend the Company's bylaws

to allow stockholders to nominate director candidates for inclusion in the Company's proxy

materials.


36.        Management noted that:

Approval of this proposal required the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares outstanding and entitled to vote on this proposal at the 2013 Annual Meeting. Shares represented by abstentions or broker non-votes on this proposal had the effect of a vote against the matter.


37.        The API Board maintains that Proposal 6 failed, even though 11.97 million votes

were cast in favor of allowing stockholders that own 1% or more of the common stock during the


prior year a right to nominate a candidate for the Board of Directors, and only 3.54 million votes

were cast against it. Stockholders at the annual meeting favored Proposal 6 by a margin of over


3-to-1.


38.        Rather than accept that an overwhelming number of stockholders voted in favor


of Proposal 6, management sought to reinterpret the voting threshold for Proposal 6.


39.        Management appears to hold that the vote for Proposal 6 is based on the total


number of shares outstanding rather than the votes cast at the Annual Meeting. Management

appears to point to Article IX, Sec. 1, which states:

ARTICLE IX, AMENDMENTS, Sec. 1. HOW AMENDED. These bylaws may be altered, amended, repealed or added to by an affirmative vote of the stockholders representing a majority of the whole capital stock entitled to vote at an Annual Meeting
or at a Special Meeting called for that purpose provided that written notice shall have been sent to each stockholder or mailed to him at his post office address of known, at



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least 10 days before the date fixed for such meeting. The notice shall set forth the
alterations, amendments or changes which are proposed to be made in such bylaws or in
lieu thereof shall set forth a brief summary of the changes to be effected therein. If,
however, all the stockholders shall be present at any regular or Specia1 Meeting, these bylaws may be amended by a unanimous vote without any previous notice. Notwithstanding the above, these bylaws may be altered, amended, repealed or added to
by the affinnative vote taken at a regular or Special Meeting of the Board of Directors.

40.        Based on Article IX, Sec. 1, and as noted in the Company's August 26 Form 8-K,

the API Board holds that the vote of a majority of the shares outstanding and entitled to vote is

required to approve Proposal 6.

VII.       TO DECLARE DEFEAT OF PROPOSAL 6, API BOARD COUNTS BROKER
NON-VOTES IN ITS FAVOR.

41.        The Board further concluded that broker non-votes will have the same effect as a


vote against Proposal 6. In every other question before the stockholders at the API 2013 Annual


Meeting, it appears that broker non-votes had no effect on the outcome of the election as brokers

are not entitled to vote on such proposals in the absence of instructions from the beneficial owner.


42.        API's attempt to use broker non-votes to count in favor of the Board is

incongruous with the principles of Delaware corporate law, Federal securities law and the listing

rules of the NYSE. Simply stated, API's actions are an affront to stockholder suffrage.


43.        Indeed, as stated in the Company's proxy materials:

Under NYSE MKT rules, only the proposal to ratify the appointment of BDO as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2014 is considered a discretionary item for which your bank or broker will have discretionary voting power if you do not give instructions with respect to tills proposal at least ten days prior to the Annual Meeting date, while the proposal to elect directors, the Say-on-Pay
Proposal, the Say-When-on-Pay Proposal, the Equity Plan Proposal, and the Proxy
Access Proposal are non-discretionary matters for which specific instructions from beneficial owners are required.

44.        Following enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Refonn and Consumer


Protection Act, national securities exchanges adopted rules prohibiting members from voting

uninstructed shares on matters related to significant - or non-routine - matters as determined by



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the rules of the SEC. The NYSE amended its Rule 452, and corresponding Section 402.08 of the

Listed Company Manual, to implement the Dodd-Frank Act's requirements.

45.        With the exception of the appointment of the independent accounting firm, all

proposals at the API Annual Meeting are non-discretionary. Broker non-votes had no effect as to

all non-discretionary matters, except as to the matter opposed by the Board, Proposal 6 - the

Proxy Access Proposal. As to Proposal 6, the Board maintained that broker non-votes had the

same effect as a vote "against" the proposal.


VIII. INTERPRETATION OF THE BYLAWS.

46.         The API Board holds that the vote of a majority of all the shares outstanding and


entitled to vote is required to approve Proposal 6.

47.         Management's interpretation of Article IX is in direct conflict with the words in


Article I of the API bylaws.

48.        Delaware courts have held that bylaws are contracts among the stockholders of a

corporation and the general rules of contract interpretation apply.

49.        Consistent with contract interpretation, Article IX, Sec. 1, should be read 'in

context and in conjunction with Article I, Sec. 4, as requiring the majority vote of quorum

present at a meeting of stockholders.

50.         Article IX, Sec. 1, states that the bylaws may be amended by "an affirmative

vote"; that is, more "for" votes than "against" plus "abstain" votes.

51.         Article IX, Sec. 1, goes on to define the subset of the vote: ''the stockholders

representing a majority of the whole capital stock entitled to vote"; that is another way of saying

quorum entitled to vote.

52.         Read together, Article IX, Sec. 1, approval requires the "for" votes of a majority

of votes cast "at an Annual Meeting or at a Special Meeting."



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53.         Such a reading is consistent with other provisions in the bylaws, including Article

I, Sec. 4, which requires a majority vote of the shares entitled to vote on such matters present in

person or by proxy for all questions (other than the two categories stated therein, none of which

is Article IX) at all meetings of the stockholders.

COUNT I
Declaratory Judgment (DGCL § Ill) - Majority Vote Required

54.        Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth

herein.


55.        As demonstrated by API's disclosures in the August 26 Form 8-K, the API Board

(incorrectly) believes that a vote of a majority of all shares outstanding and entitled to vote is


required to approve Proposal 6.

56.         An actual and justiciable legal controversy exists as to the vote threshold required

for a bylaws amendment.

57.        Knowles is entitled to a declaration, pursuant to API's bylaws, that at all meetings

of the stockholders, all questions - including proposals to amend the Company's bylaws - shall


be determined by a majority vote of the shares entitled to vote on such matters present in person

or by proxy, except as to the election of directors or as to matters for which the manner of


deciding is otherwise specifically regulated by statute.

COUNT II
Declaratory Judgment (DGCL § Ill) - Article IX

58.        Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth

herein.










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59.        As demonstrated by API's disclosures in the August 26 Form 8-K, the API Board

(incorrectly) believes that a vote of a majority of all shares outstanding and entitled to vote is

required to approve Proposal 6.

60.         An actual and justiciable legal controversy exists as to the vote threshold required

for a bylaws amendment.


61.         The Board's incorrect reading of Article IX of the API bylaws serves to

disenfranchise API stockholders; thus, such a reading is contrary to Delaware law and public

policy.


62.         Knowles is entitled to a declaration that Article IX, Sec. 1, is unreasonable,


invalid and void to the extent it is read to require the vote of a majority of all outstanding shares.

63.         Knowles is entitled to a declaration that Article IX, Sec. 1, read in context and in

conjunction with Article I, Sec. 4, requires the majority vote of a quorum present at a meeting of

stockholders.

COUNT III
Declaratory Judgment (DGCL § 111) - Broker Non-Votes

64.         Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth

herein.

65.         Broker non-votes may not have an effect on the vote results of Proposal 6.


66.         The Board (incorrectly) counted broker non-votes as votes against Proposal 6.

67.         An actual and justiciable legal controversy exists as to whether broker non-votes

may affect the vote results of Proposal 6 by counting as votes against it.

68.        Knowles is entitled to a declaration that broker non-votes, which may be counted




API, and thus have no effect on the vote results.




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COUNT IV
Declaratory Judgment (DGCL § 225(b)) - Stockholder Vote on Proposal 6

69.        Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as if fully set .forth

herein.


70.        On August 23, 2013, the Company held its 2013 Annual Meeting of Stockholders,

where the Company's stockholders voted on, among other things, Proposal 6, a stockholder

proposal to amend the Company's bylaws to allow stockholders to nominate director candidates


for inclusion in the Company's proxy materials.

71.        The votes cast in respect to Proposal 6 were 11,970,378 - "for," 3,538,820


"Against," 371,529 - "Abstain," and 12,281,996 - "Broker Non-Votes."


72.         Yet, API announced that the stockholders rejected the stockholder proposal


requesting that the Board amend the Company's bylaws to allow stockholders to nominate


director candidates for inclusion in the Company's proxy materials.


73.        An actual and justiciable legal controversy exists as to whether Proposal 6 was


approved or rejected.

74.        Knowles is entitled to a declaration that the stockholders approved Proposal 6,


which received the requisite votes in favor.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter an order:


A.          declaring that at all meetings of the stockholders, all questions - including


proposals to amend the Company's bylaws - shall be determined by a majority vote of the shares


entitled to vote on such matters present in person or by proxy, except as to the election of


directors or as to matters for which the manner of deciding is otherwise specifically regulated by


statute;






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B.          declaring that Article IX, Sec. 1, read in context and in conjunction with Article I,


Sec. 4, requires the majority vote of a quorum present at a meeting of stockholders;


C.          declaring that broker non-votes, which may be counted for purposes of quorum,


must be disregarded for purposes of proposals to amend the bylaws of API, and thus have no


effect on the vote results;


D.          declaring that the stockholders of API approved Proposal 6, the proposal to


amend the Company's bylaws to allow stockholders to nominate director candidates for


inclusion in the Company's proxy materials, at the API Annual Meeting held on August 23, 2013;


E.          awarding Plaintiff its costs and disbursements in this action, including reasonable


attorneys' fees; and






proper.


F.


granting Plaintiff such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and




PROCTO~ I-IEYMAN LLP


lsi Samuel T Hirzel
Kurt M. Heyman (# 3054) Samuel T. Hirzel (# 4415)
Dawn Kurtz Crompton (# 5579) 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 200
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 472-7300
Attorneys for Plaintiff




OF COUNSEL:

LOCKE LORD LLP
Marlon Q. Paz
701 8th Street NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 220-6909



Dated: November 6,2013




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